Appealing on the ground that the judgment  is not supported by substantial evidence is often unsuccessful, but that doesn’t mean an appellant is without hope.  The attack should not be based on the quantity of evidence but rather the quality of it.  As noted in Kuhn v. Department of General Services (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 1627, the appellate court was not meant “‘merely to echo the determinations of the trial court.  A decision supported by a mere scintilla of evidence need not be affirmed on review.’”  (Id. at p. 1633.) 

Kuhn also notes that it is not enough to have ány evidence supporting the judgment; it must be “reasonable . . . , credible, and of solid value. . . The ultimate determination is whether a reasonable trier of fact could have found for the respondent based on the whole record.”  (Id. at p. 1633.)  Kuhn also includes inferences as does In re Estate of Young (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 62, 76 [court distinguishes between inferences based on “logic and reason,” rather than “mere speculation or conjecture.’”]

 What this means for the appellant is that if the respondent has prevailed based on evidence that is not reasonable, the appellant must state facts showing the unreasonableness of the testimony. For instance, if a single witness testifies to what he or she observed, then contrary facts showing either the witness could never have observed those facts or wasn’t even in the same location must be in the record.  This requires a showing that the evidence is “inherently improbable” or “implausible” so that the falsity or impossibility of the evidence is apparent. (Evje v. City Title Ins. Co. (1953) 120 Cal.App.2d 488, 492.) 

Simply rearguing the weight of the evidence will not satisfy this standard.